DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY P Schmelzer DATE 7/2/85
RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. REASON(S)
ERS/RSL ERSTRAC MARKINGS ☐
DECLASSIFIED ☐ RELEASABLE ☑
RELEASE DENIED ☐
PA/PP FOIA EXEMPTIONS

(28)

**Saudi Arabia**

1. 60 or 40 Planes for Saudi Arabia
2. Value of Saudi Military Purchases
3. Other Saudi FMS Cases this Year
4. F-15 vs. Other US Aircraft
5. Why Not the F-5 and I-Hawk as the Saudi Air Defense
6. Capabilities and Deployment of the Hawk
7. F-15 Configuration
8. F-15 Bomb Carrying Capability
9. F-15 Refueling Capability
10. Ease of Maintenance
11. Modification of the F-5s
12. Tabuk
13. Other Air Base Facilities in the Northwest
14. Threat to Saudi Arabia
15. Iraqi Forces
16. Iraqi Attack on Saudi Arabia
17. Iraqi Offensive Capability
18. Iraqi Fear of a Counter Attack
19. PDRY Attack on Saudi Arabia
20. Saudi-Iranian Relations
21. Saudi Combat with Israel
22. Saudi Helicopters to Egypt in 1973
23. Saudi Arabia as a Fourth Confrontation State
24. Saudi F-15 Threat to Israel
25. Impact on Israeli Military Situation
26. Israeli View of the Sale
27. Israeli Pre-Emptive Strike
28. Saudi Participation in Future Wars
29. F-15 Transfer
30. Transfer of Less Sophistocated Aircraft
31. F-5 Training of Egyptians in 1975
32. F-5 Training of Egyptians in 1976
33. Saudi Forces in Syria and Jordan
34. Saudi Skilled Manpower
35. Persian Gulf Study
36. Impact of Refusal of Sale
37. Mirage F-1 to Saudi Arabia
38. Follow-on Sale of AWACS
39. Physical Security of F-15
40. Hovercraft
41. US Air Force Benefit

## 60 or 40 Planes for Saudi Arabia

Q: Why have we settled on 60 planes for Saudi Arabia? Didn't the 1974 DOD study recommend 40 aircraft?

A: The DOD study did recommend that the aging British Lightning be replaced by 40 advanced fighters -- roughly on a one-for-one basis. The study did not analyse the threat at that time or project it forward.

When the Saudis purchased their Lightnings in the mid-60s the region was quite different. The British assured the security of the Persian Gulf and Iraq had not begun its military buildup.

In 1974 conditions had changed, but not as substantially as they have since then. In 1974 Iraq had over 100 combat aircraft; now it has around 400 such planes. Thirty of Iraq's present inventory of planes are bombers and about 100 are advanced fighters. Saudi Arabia now has 35 rapidly deteriorating Lightnings and about 100 F-5s.

In 1983, Iraq will have a slightly larger total number of combat aircraft, but double the number of advanced fighters -- some 200 of them. If the F-15 sale is approved, Saudi Arabia will then have 170 combat aircraft -- less than half Iraq's total -- and 60 advanced fighters -- less than 1/3 Iraq's total.

Sixty F-15s will provide Saudi Arabia with three squadrons and an adequate number of training aircraft. One squadron will provide air defense for the eastern oil fields, another for the southern region where Saudis in the past have been attacked from the air by Egyptians and South Yemenis and another squadron to protect the central region which includes Jidda and Riyadh.

## Value of Saudi Military Purchases

Q: What is the value of US arms sales to Saudi Arabia?

A: A distinction must be drawn between total FMS purchases by a country and "arms sales." FMS purchases by Saudi Arabia now total approximately $15 billion. However, its purchases of weapons and ammunition have equaled only $1.2 billion. The balance has been for supporting equipment and services, including $8.2 billion for construction contracts managed by the Corps of Engineers. Most of the financing for construction has gone to private contractors, many of whom are not US firms.

## Other Saudi Cases this Year

Q: What other major FMS cases for Saudi Arabia does the Administration intend to submit during the coming year?

A: The Administration does not anticipate submitting any LOAs for major weapons systems for Saudi Arabia during the coming year. With the F-15, Saudi Arabia will have fulfilled virtually all of the major equipment recommendations of the Department of Defense's 1974 surveys of Saudi defense requirements through 1984.

We anticipate submitting three cases representing substantial dollar volumes for the continuation of existing programs: equipping and training additional battalions of the Saudi National Guard; operation and maintenance of naval facilities at Jubail and Jidda, and; continuation of contractor services for the F-5 program. We will also submit a number of cases for Corps of Engineer services in connection with military construction projects of substantial cost, together with some minor cases for training, spare parts and ammunition.

The Department provided a detailed listing, together with estimated costs, of anticipated Saudi requests for equipment, training and construction as part of the Persian Gulf military balance and absorptive capacity study transmitted to the Congress earlier this year.

## F-15 Vs Other US Aircraft

Q: Why are the Saudis receiving the F-15 rather than another aircraft?

A: A 1974 USG survey team concluded the Saudis needed additional F-5E/F type fighters as well as an advanced fighter to replace the aging British Lightning interceptors. The team said that the Saudis especially had a legitimate requirement for an all-weather, air superiority fighter to supplement the day-visual capability and limited range and radar coverage of the F-5s.

The Saudis considered the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18.

The F-14 has most of the same air superiority characteristics as the F-15, but is a two-seat aircraft and the Saudis preferred a one-seater.

The F-16, a single-engine plane, provides an excellent ground strike capability, which was not the objective of Saudi planning. The U.S. also believed the Saudis should emphasize the air defense role.

The F-18 is not yet in US inventories and, hence, under the terms of the President's arms transfer policy, not releaseable abroad.

The F-15 provided the great range and radar coverage needed in a country of Saudi Arabia's vast size with limited radar/air defense protection. The F-15 is an all-weather interceptor with two engines and meets the requirements that the Saudis and we believe are appropriate for their air defense.

## Why Not the F-5 and I-Hawk as Saudi Air Defense

Q: Why can't the F-5 aircraft and the I-HAWK SAM air defense system satisfy Saudi defensive needs?

A: Saudi F-5s and I-HAWK SAM air defenses could be overcome by a determined attack from Iraq with its advanced fighter/bombers and strong ground forces. The F-5s are designed by the Saudis for use primarily in an air-to-ground role. Moreover, the F-5 does not have the endurance, range, all-weather or radar capability or other air superiority characteristics to counter the modern fighter/bombers in the Iraqi inventory.

The I-HAWK system is too thinly spread to give adequate protection to all the Kingdom's vital areas.

Finally, the Kingdom's rudimentary and thinly spread radar coverage could allow an attacking air force to make deep penetration without detection.

The F-15 with its increased range and radar capability will make a significant contribution to closing these gaps in Saudi Arabia's air defense system.

## HAWK MISSILES

Q. Are the Hawk missiles a threat to Israel?

A. --The Hawk is a defensive air-to-ground weapon which, while inherently mobile, is customarily used by Saudi Arabia in fixed sites. The U.S. has imposed no restrictions on Saudi use of this weapon within Saudi Arabia. Hawk units are stationed at Dhahran in the oil-rich Eastern Province, at Riyadh the capital, near Jidda on the Red Sea, and have been deployed at Tabuk since before 1973. Other units, currently undergoing conversion to I-Hawk, will be stationed, in addition to Dhahran, Riyadh, Jidda and Tabuk, at Khamis Mushayt in the south, at Taif near Jidda, and Sharurah on the border with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

--The maximum range of the Hawk missile does not extend as far as the Saudi border; the Hawk could not possibly cover Israeli airspace from Tabuk.

## F-15 Configuration

Q. There is a contradiction in the comments on the AIPAC memorandum provided by the State Department. You say that Saudi Arabia will get the USAF standard configuration for the F-15, but then you also say that Saudi Arabia will not get the AIM-9-L air-to-air missile which is on the USAF model. What are the facts?

A. The term "configuration", as we used it, refers to the air frame and its subsystems, not to specific munitions such as the L version of the AIM-9.

Saudi Arabia will not receive the AIM-9-L, nor will it get certain crypto and other sensitive devices which are not releaseable for security reasons. Saudi Arabia will receive the AIM-9-J model of the missile. The AIM-9-L has been released only to NATO countries, Japan and Australia.

## F-15 Bomb Carrying Capacity

**Q: Will the F-15 be able to carry 18 500-pound bombs?**

**A:** Although manufacturer's specifications state the F-15 can carry up to 12,000 pounds of external air-to-ground ordnance, the US Air Force version is currently certified to carry a maximum of one 2,000-lb. bomb on each of three "hard points". Modification of the F-15 to permit carrying additional ordnance is a highly complex undertaking which would require US approval and assistance. The plane's hard points are also used to hang external fuel tanks: using the hard points for bomb loads limits the aircraft range and time on station in an air defense role.

## Refueling Capability

Q: Will the F-15 have a refueling capability? Is it compatible with the F-5 capability?

A: --The air refueling capability of the F-15 is not compatible with the refueling system of the KC-130 tankers currently in the Saudi inventory.

--There is no plan to modify the aircraft to permit aerial refueling of the F-15 in Saudi Arabia.

## Ease of Maintenance

Q. Are you being accurate when you state that the F-15 is easier to maintain than the British Lightnings?

A. There is no question that the F-15 employs some of the most advanced aviation technology and includes highly complex subsystems.

One of the features of the F-15, however, is that its complex components are designed for ease of maintenance on the flight line. There are built-in-test equipment devices that simplify for the pilot and flight crew the identification and replacement of defective modules. When a fault is detected, one black box can be pulled and another substituted for it.

This design allows USAF squadrons to maintain their aircraft at a rate of about 30-40 maintenance hours per flying hour as compared to 100-110 maintenance hours per flying hour for the Saudi Lightnings.

## MODIFICATION OF F-5s

"Congress was not informed by the Pentagon -- about the modifications to the F-5s until Saudi Arabia tried -- with only partial success -- to purchase Maverick guided missile bombs and precision laser bombs to be placed on the modified F-5s -- in 1976 -- after the Nelson amendment had been enacted. Did the Pentagon tell the President the planes would be modified, not standard, F-5s?...One of the most important modifications that the Pentagon permitted allows the F-5 to be refueled in midair. The ability to refuel in midair gives these F-5s a much greater range than the nonmodified F-5s and only the Saudi F-5s have this capability.

A. All contracts to modify the Saudi F-5s were concluded before the enactment of the Nelson amendment in late 1974. Our records indicate that on at least one occasion, January 25, 1975, Congressional staff was briefed by the State Department on the F-5 sale to Saudi Arabia. Our recollection is that additional briefings also took place.

Decisions in the Administration to permit the sale of F-5 aircraft to Saudi Arabia took place initially in the 1970-71 period, and fifty F-5s were sold in September 1971. On October 22, 1974, the U.S. sold additional F-5s to Saudi Arabia as well as an "improvement package" for these and the earlier F-5Es permitting them to carry Mavericks and laser-guided bombs and to be refueled in flight. These decisions were made under the normal procedures in effect at the time for approving Foreign Military Sales.

In December 1971 the Departments of State and Defense indicated the USG had no political objections to Saudi Arabia's acquiring an inflight refueling capability through commercial channels. The Department of State approved export licenses for the sale of four KC-130 aerial tankers on November 2, 1972 and subsequently licensed the sale of two more. Thus, the decision to permit the Saudis to acquire aerial tankers and the decision to sell the Saudis the F-5 were taken in the same time frame with the knowledge that Saudi Arabia would be capable of refueling the F-5 aircraft in the air.

Since 1972 modification of F-5 aircraft to permit air refueling has generally been available to all purchases of the F-5; Singapore, Switzerland and Brazil as well as Saudi Arabia have acquired this modification to the aircraft.

Because of the limited range of the F-5, it would barely be possible for Saudi F-5s to reach Israeli territory after air refueling when operating from the closest Saudi F-5 base at Taif. Because of the visability of F-5 deployment and the vulnerability of KC-130s, there are significant practical constraints on Saudi deployment of the F-5 and the aerial tankers to Tabuk, the military air field closest to Israel.

## Saudi Arabia as a Fourth Confrontation State

Q: Given the accelerated military modernization and acquisition program that has taken place in Saudi Arabia, is it not now a fourth confrontation state?

A: Saudi Arabia is not a fourth confrontation state. It shares no land border with Israel; it has not participated in any significant way in military operations in past Arab-Israeli wars; and its leaders have repeatedly assured us they have no aggressive intentions toward any state in the area. Saudi Arabia does not, and will not for the foreseeable future, possess a major military force. The combined strength of the Saudi army, air force and navy and national guard is considerably less than the combined National Guard forces of five US southern states, and yet Saudi Arabia is almost one-fourth the size of the United States with the largest oil reserves in the world.

## Saudi Threat to Israel

Q: Would not Saudi Arabia pose a threat to Israel with possession of the F-15s?

A: Saudi Arabia is not a confrontation state on Israel's border. Its leaders repeatedly have assured the United States they have no aggressive intentions toward any state in the area and that they share our interest in a stable and peaceful Middle East.

The F-15s will be primarily an air defense system and will not be outfitted for a significant ground attack capabilty and will not constitute a threat against Israeli installations. To use F-15s in a future conflict would leave Saudi territory very vulnerable to an air strike from Israel. If the Saudis were interested in obtaining a capability for striking Israeli targets, they would presumably be seeking aircraft such as the Jaquar, Mirage F-1 or F-16.

Historically, Saudi Arabia has avoided actual combat in Arab/Israeli conflicts, although in 1973 a Saudi brigade moving toward a reserve position in Syria, was involved in a brief skirmish with Israeli troops. In 1976, the Saudis withdrew the limited land forces that they maintained in Syria and Jordan, partially to avoid entanglement in a future conflict.

The Saudis are well aware that using their F-15s against Israel could jeopardize their military supply relationship with the United States, and thus seriously impair their defenses.

## Impact on Israeli Military Situation

Q: Will the F-15 sale complicate the military situation for Israel? Will it force them to divert some of their air squadrons from other theaters?

A. Israeli positioning of their air assets is based on their perceptions of all possible threats. Notwithstanding considerable evidence that Saudi F-15s would play no part in any future conflict, the Israelis might choose to modify their aircraft deployments as a hedge against possible Saudi involvement. But given the limited airspace to be defended and the excellent capabilities of the Israeli Air Force, it is most unlikely that any such modified deployment would constitute a diversion of forces from any theater.

## Israeli View

Q: Has Israeli opposition to Saudi Arabia's acquiring F-15s been taken into consideration in our decision to proceed with the sale?

A: We are aware of Israel's opposition to the sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the Arab governments are opposed to the sale of aircraft to Israel. We would not expect either side to support sales to the other, but hope that there will be understanding of how these sales fit into the context of our efforts to reach a Middle East peace settlement.

## Israelis Pre-Emptive Strike Against Saudi Arabia

Q. Should there be an attack on Israel by Egypt or Syria, how likely is it that Israel would act to limit Saudi options by launching a pre-emptive strike to eliminate the potential threat posed by the F-15s? What would be the consequences of such a strike?

A. Saudi Arabia is not a confrontation state and has abstained from any significant combat in previous Arab-Israeli wars and any threatening gestures toward Israel. Israel has not launched pre-emptive strikes against either Iraq or Libya, nations which have extensive inventories of sophisticated Soviet-supplied equipment. Under these circumstances, and considering Saudi Arabia's intentions to use the F-15 defensively and not to deploy it so as to provoke an Israeli attack, we regard an Israeli pre-emptive strike against Saudi Arabia as unlikely.

## Saudi Participation in Future Wars

Q: Won't Saudi leaders be under considerable pressure to join in any future war effort against Israel?

A: --Each Letter of Offer accepted (DD Form 1513) contains several conditions of sale including the condition that the articles and services to be provided cannot be retransferred to a Third Country without the prior approval of the USG. In all of our conversations with the Saudis--and we have talked to the highest levels--they have indicated that they will abide by the provisions under which the United States supplies military equipment. At the same time they have assured us they have no aggressive intentions against any state in the region. The defensive nature of Saudi Arabia's armed forces modernization program and Saudi assurances they will not train the pilots of other Arab countries on the F-15 or transfer the aircraft were stressed by Vice Minister of Defense Prince Turki in his talks with Under Secretary Benson during her visit to Saudi Arabia this year. Similar assurances have been given by the Saudis to recent Congressional delegations visiting Saudi Arabia.

## F-15 Transfer

Q: Could Saudi Arabia transfer its F-15s to another Arab country for use against Israel?

A: The transfer would be statutorily prohibited; the United States would have to give its assent as required by the Arms Export Control Act. Thus, a transfer is highly unlikely, although theoretically possible, and would put at risk the good relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In the event of an unauthorized transfer, the U.S. could stop the flow of support, rendering the F-15s and other major US-origin systems (I Hawk, F-5s) ineffective.

In addition, a transfer of F-15s would face serious practical obstacles. No other Arab nation would have the trained pilots or technicians, ground support equipment, spare parts inventory or munitions. Preparations for such a transfer could not be accomplished without US personel becoming aware.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MP

S-80

## Transfer of Less Sophisticated Aircraft

Q: Is the F-15 sale to the Saudis likely to result in any requests by the Saudis to transfer some of their less sophisticated planes to other nations?

A: The F-15s are intended in part to replace the U.K. origin Lightnings, currently in the Saudi inventory. The Lightnings are rapidly nearing the end of their structural life and will no longer be safe to fly. We therefore do not believe these aircraft will be transferred.

Saudi Arabia has requested our approval of the possible transfer of four of their older F-5B aircraft to the Yemen Arab Republic to begin the process of training the Yemenis in Western equipment. That possible transfer is unrelated to the proposed F-15 sale - Congress was notified of this possible transfer on September 20, 1977. The Saudis plan to retain the remainder of their F-5s for ground support and therefore they will not be transferred.

## F-5 Training of Egyptians in 1975

Q: You state that Saudi training of Egyptians on F-5s was not contrary to US law in 1975 and that the law was changed to require U.S. consent in 1976. In fact, didn't the State Department consider this training a violation of the Foreign Military Sales Act and didn't you warn the Saudis for that reason to cease?

A: At the time the Egyptians went to Saudi Arabia for F-5 training there was no provision in US law which precluded the training of third-country nationals on US-origin equipment. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 enacted a requirement for US authorization prior to the transfer of an US-provided training.

The Department carefully considered at the time whether the training involved the unauthorized release by the Saudis to the Egyptian pilots of information and, accordingly, violated the terms of our FMS contract. Strictly speaking, it seemed that a violation of the contract terms had occurred. We concluded, however, that since there were so few (six) Egyptian pilots involved, and the information communicated on the F-5 was not very sensitive, there had not been a substantial violation of the contract terms within the meaning of Section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act. At that time,

Section 3(c) made a country ineligible for Foreign Military Sales if there were a substantial violation of the terms of a sales agreement.

On the basis of the foregoing, we told both the Saudi and Egyptian Governments that we wanted them to end the training. They did so.

## F-5 Training of Egyptians in 1976

Q: Contrary to what the Department has stated. weren't there 12 Egyptians trained on Saudi F-5s in 1975 and another 8 in 1976?

A: Our records show that 6 Egyptian pilots and 9 technicians were trained by Saudi Arabia in late 1975 and early 1976. A second group of -- I believe -- 9 technicians arrived for training in May 1976. At our request, that training program was never started and the 9 Egyptians left for home.

## Saudi Forces in Syria or Jordan

Q: Have Saudi forces and aircraft been stationed or participated in maneuvers in Jordan or Syria?

A: During the 1973 war, a Saudi Army brigade was stationed in Syria in a reserve position. This unit remained in Syria after the war and other Saudi units were deployed in Jordan.

Saudi forces, wholly under Saudi control, did participate in brief maneuvers in Syria in 1975. No Saudi aircraft have ever been stationed in Jordan or Syria nor are there currently any other Saudi forces in either country.

The Saudis removed all their forces from both Syria and Jordan in 1976.

## Saudi Skilled Manpower

Q: Do you think the Saudis have the skilled manpower to handle the F-15?

A: Saudi Arabia is clearly deficient in numbers of skilled personnel to operate and maintain sophisticated military equipment, but steady progress is being made in enlarging the skilled labor pool. Training and assistance by US contractor personnel will be important in enabling the Saudis to assimilate the F-15.

Our data indicate that from the Saudi's present and anticipated pool of fighter aircraft pilots and technicians there will be adequate personnel to assimilate the F-15 beginning in 1982. Pilots will essentially be drawn from the Lightning program. By the end of 1982 the RSAF should have a total of 2,885 fighter aircraft technicians against a requirement of 2,550.

An estimated 500 to 600 contractor personnel will be required for initial introduction of the F-15; the number would peak at about two years after the RSAF receives the first F-15.

## Persian Gulf Study

Q. Does the study of the Persian Gulf regional arms balance and absorptive capacities support the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia?

A. Yes.

The study analyzes the threats to Saudi Arabia and the forces of potential antagonists relative to Saudi forces. Saudi Arabia has a smaller military force and less combat experience than neighboring countries. In particular, Saudi air defenses need to be strengthened. The study indicates that Saudi Arabia will require modern air defense aircraft after its aging Lightnings are phased out if Saudi Arabia is to meet the prospective air threat in the 1980s.

Although Saudi Arabia will require outside assistance in assimilating the new aircraft, the substantial progress that the Saudis have made in their F-5 program should facilitate that process.

## Impact of Refusal to Sell

Q. Will the Saudis implement an oil embargo or take other retaliatory action against the U.S. if the sale is not approved?

A. The Saudi approach to our relationship has been one of cooperation, not confrontation. They have made no threats of retaliation. As you will recall, during the Congressional hearings on the Sidewinders and Mavericks the Saudi Government issued a statement specifically disclaiming any intention to take retaliatory steps against the U.S. That fundamental Saudi policy has not changed. Rather, the Saudi Government has urged that in trust and friendship we not abandon our longstanding policy of meeting in responsible fashion Saudi needs for defensive military equipment. The real danger in denying this sale would be the consequent loss of Saudi confidence in our concern for their security. We need to have this confidence particularly strong and unimpaired as we ask Saudi cooperation in the Middle East peace and in energy price and supply.

## Mirage F-1 to Saudi Arabia

Q: Why not let the Saudis buy elsewhere?

A: --The Mirage F-1 would most likely be the Saudis' alternate choice, and they might well purchase more than sixty aircraft to make up for the qualitative limitations of the Mirage. The Mirage is scheduled for delivery to Iraq and may be sold to Syria. French-Arab coproduction of the Mirage was at one time under consideration; this could create a situation far more threatening to Israel's security than the provision of F-15s to Saudi Arabia.

## Follow-on Sale of AWACS

Q. Won't the sale of F-15 fighters stimulate a request for AWACS?

A. An F-15 sale will not lead to the sale of E2C or E3A. The The F-15 has an excellent radar. Were the Saudis to purchase an aircraft with a less effective radar than the F-15 has, they would be more likely to seek an airborne radar system.

The Saudis have never expressed any interest in either the E2C or E3A.

## Compromise of Aircraft

Q: What is the risk of compromise; what is the level of physical security for the F-15?

A: --Security measures in Saudi Arabia are excellent and compromise of classified data to the Soviet Union, directly or indirectly, is highly unlikely considering the strong anti-communist attitudes of the Saudi Arabian people. The RSAF is extremely conscientious about military security, particularly physical security involving flight line or maintenance facilities. Although there are third-country nationals in Saudi Arabia, their access to U.S. classified information is not authorized. Airfields and other secured areas in Saudi Arabia have very tight entry and exit controls. Further, Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic relations with any communist country and Saudi controls over entry by foreigners is very strict.

## Hovercraft

Q. Another contradiction: In its comments on the AIPAC Memorandum the State Department says that the Saudi Navy does not have hovercraft. Yet the Saudi Coast Guard does have hovercraft. Comments?

A. Our answer should have been more complete. The Saudi Coast Guard -- which is a branch of the Ministry of Interior, not Defense -- does have eight small British hovercraft.

They are used in anti-smuggling surveillance. Four are in the Red Sea near Jidda and four are in the Persian Gulf near Dammam.

The boats can carry 15-20 men for short distances. They are armed with one 50 calibre machine gun each.

The Saudi Navy has no plans to acquire hovercraft.

S-41

## U.S. Air Force Benefit from Sale

Q. Is it not true that the USAF has pushed this sale to reduce the cost of the aircraft to itself?

A. Following a USAF survey of Saudi military requirements in 1974 which recommended that the aging Lightning aircraft be replaced, the Saudis received briefings on four U.S. aircraft, the F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-18. The Saudis followed up with visits to plants. After careful consideration the Saudis made their own decision. No attempt was made by the USAF or anyone else to influence their choice.

Executive Branch procedures for reviewing foreign military sales have been carefully followed in the case of the proposal to sell F-15s to Saudi Arabia. The proposal for the sale was carefully considered under the provisions of the Administration's arms transfer policy and found to be consistent with those provisions.